Web Master Note:
Credit is given to Thomas P. McIninch for compiling the story below.
Considering the secrecy surrounding even the existence of black
projects occurring at Groom Lake, the declassified records complied by
Mr. McIninch are an invaluable documentation of an extremely "black"
era of the CIA's stewardship of this dry lake facility.

CREDITS:
Thomas P. McIninch, available
from Skunk Works Digest. Joe Baugher
Lockheed Aircraft Since 1913, Rene J. Francillon, Naval Institute
Press,1987. The American Fighter, Enzo Angelucci and Peter Bowers,Orion
Books,1987. The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Aircraft Armament,Bill
Gunston,Orion Books, 1988. Lockheed Blackbirds, Anthony M. Thorborough
and Peter E. Davies, Motorbooks International, 1988.
Unclassified security ratings that are for
historical interest only. This page and the document it comes from,
entitled OXCART History (DON: SC-86-010115), has been UNCLASSIFIED
according to Senior Crown Security Class Guide dated 11/01/89, approved
and dated 25 February 91.
S= Secret
C= Classified
U= Unclassified
(S) One spring day in 1962 a test pilot named Louis Schalk, employed by
the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, took off from the Nevada desert in
an aircraft the like of which had never been seen before. A casual
observer would have been startled by the appearance of this vehicle; he
would perhaps have noticed especially its extremely long, slim, shape,
its two enormous jet engines, its long sharp, projecting nose, and its
swept-back wings which appeared far too short to support the fuselage
in flight. He might well have realized that this was a revolutionary
airplane; he could not have known that it would be able to fly at three
times the speed of sound for more than 3,000 miles without refueling,
or that toward the end of its flight, when fuel began to run low, it
could cruise at over 90,000 feet. Still less would he have known of the
equipment it was to carry, or of the formidable problems attending its
design and construction.
(U) There was, of course, no casual observer present. The aircraft had
been designed and built for reconnaissance; it was projected as a
successor to the U-2. Its development had been carried out in profound
secrecy. Despite the numerous designers, engineers, skilled and
unskilled workers, administrators and others who had been involved in
the affair, no authentic accounts, and indeed scarcely any accounts at
all, had leaked. Many aspects have not been revealed to this day, and
many are likely to remain classified for some time to come.
(S) The official designation of the aircraft was A-12. By a sort of
inspired perversity, however, it came to be called OXCART, a code word
also applied to the program under which it was developed. The secrecy
in which it was so long shrouded has lifted a bit, and the purpose of
this article is to give some account of the inception, development,
operation, and untimely demise of this Remarkable airplane. The OXCART
no longer flies, but it left a legacy of technological achievement
which points the way to new projects. And it became the progenitor of a
similar but somewhat less sophisticated reconnaissance vehicle called
the SR-71, whose existence is well known to press and public.
The U-2 dated from 1954, when its development began under the direction
of a group headed by Richard M. Bissell of CIA. In June 1956, the
aircraft became operational, but officials predicted that its useful
lifetime over the USSR could hardly be much more than 18 months or two
years. Its first flight over Soviet territory revealed that the defense
warning system not only detected but tracked it quite accurately. Yet,
it remained a unique and (S) invaluable source of intelligence
information for almost four years, until on 1 May 1960, Francis Gary
Powers was shot down near Sverdlovsk.
(U) Meanwhile, even as the U-2 commenced its active career, efforts
were under way to make it less vulnerable. The hope was to reduce the
vehicle's radar cross-section, so that it would become less susceptible
to detection. New developments in radar-absorbing materials were tried
out and achieved considerable success, though not enough to solve the
problem. Various far-out designs were explored, most of them seeking to
create an aircraft capable of flying at extremely high altitudes,
though still at relatively slow speed. None of them proved practicable.
(S) Eventually, in the fall of 1957, Bissell arranged with a contractor
for a job of operations analysis to determine how far the probability
of shooting down an airplane varied respectively with the plane's
speed, altitude, and radar cross-section. This analysis demonstrated
that supersonic speed greatly reduced the chances of detection by
radar. The probability of being shot down was not of course reduced to
zero, but it was evident that the supersonic line of approach was worth
serious consideration. Therefore, from this time on, attention focused
increasingly on the possibility of building a vehicle which could fly
at extremely high speeds as well as great altitudes, and which would
also incorporate the best that could be attained in radar-absorbing
capabilities. Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and Convair Division of
General Dynamics were informed of the general requirements, and their
designers set to work on the problem without as yet receiving any
contract or funds from the government. From the fall of 1957 to late
1958 these designers constantly refined and adapted their respective
schemes.
(S) Bissell realized that development and production of such an
aircraft would be exceedingly expensive, and that in the early stages
at least it would be doubtful whether the project could succeed. To
secure the necessary funds for such a program, high officials would
have to receive the best and most authoritative presentation of
whatever prospects might unfold. Accordingly, he got together a panel
consisting of two distinguished authorities on aero- dynamics and one
physicist, with E. M. Land of the Polaroid Corporation as chairman.
Between 1957 and 1959 this panel met about six times, usually in Land's
office in Cambridge. Lockheed and Convair designers attended during
parts of the sessions. So also did the Assistant Secretaries of the Air
Force and Navy concerned with research and development, together with
one or two of their technical advisors. One useful consequence of the
participation of service representatives was that bureaucratic and
jurisdictional feuds were reduced virtually to nil. Throughout the
program both Air Force and Navy gave valuable assistance and
cooperation.
(S) As the months went by, the general outlines of what might be done
took shape in the minds of those concerned. Late in November 1958, the
members of the panel held a crucial meeting. They agreed that it now
appeared feasible to build an aircraft of such speed and altitude as to
be very difficult to track by radar. They recommended that the
president be asked to approve in principle a further prosecution of the
project, and to make funds available for further studies and tests. The
president and his Scientific Advisor, Dr. James Killian were already
aware of what was going on, and when CIA officials went to them with
the recommendations of the panel they received a favorable hearing. The
President gave his approval. Lockheed and Convair were then asked to
submit definite proposals, funds were made available to them, and the
project took on the code name GUSTO.
Less than a year later the two proposals were essentially complete,
and on 20 July 1959, the President was again briefed. This time he gave
final approval, which signified that the program could get fully under
way.
The next major step was to choose between the Lockheed and Convair
designs. On 20 August 1959 specifications of the two proposals were
submitted to a joint DOD/USAF/CIA selection panel:
(S) The Lockheed design was selected, Project GUSTO terminated, and the
program to develop a new U-2 follow-on aircraft was names OXCART. On 3
September 1959, CIA authorized Lockheed to proceed with antiradar
studies, aerodynamic structural tests, and engineering designs, and on
30 January 1960 gave the green light to produce 12 aircraft.
(S) Pratt and Whitney Division of United Aircraft Corporation had been
involved in discussions of the project, and undertook to develop the
propulsion system. Their J-58 engine, which was to be used in the A-12,
had been sponsored originally by the US Navy for its own purposes, and
was to be capable of a speed of Mach 3.0. Navy interest in the
development was diminishing, however, and the Secretary of Defense had
decided to withdraw from the program at the end of 1959. CIA's
requirement was that the engine and aircraft be further developed and
optimized for a speed of Mach 3.2. The new contract called for initial
assembly of three advanced experimental engines for durability and
reliability testing, and provision of three engines for experimental
flight testing in early 1961.
(S) The Primary camera manufacturer was Perkin-Elmer. Because of the
extreme complexity of the design, however, a decision was soon made
that a back-up system might be necessary in the event the Perkin-Elmer
design ran into production problems, and Eastman Kodak was also asked
to build a camera. Minneapolis-Honeywell Corporation was selected to
provide both the inertial navigation and automatic flight control
system. The Firewell Corporation and the David Clark Corporation became
the prime sources of pilot equipment and associated life support
hardware.
(U) Lockheed's designer was Clarence L. (Kelly) Johnson, creator of the
U-2, and he called his new vehicle not A-12 but A-11. Its design
exhibited many innovations. Supersonic airplanes, however, involve a
multitude of extremely difficult design problems. Their payload-range
performance is highly sensitive to engine weight, structural weight,
fuel consumption, and aerodynamic efficiency. Small mistakes in
predicting these values can lead to large errors in performance. Models
of the A-11 were tested and retested, adjusted and readjusted, during
thousands of hours in the wind tunnel. Johnson was confident of his
design, but no one could say positively whether the bird would fly,
still less whether it would fulfill the extremely demanding
requirements laid down for it.
(U) To make the drawings and test the model was one thing; to build the
air- craft was another. The most numerous problems arose from the
simple fact that in flying through the atmosphere at its designed speed
the skin of the air- craft would be subjected to a temperature of more
than 550 degrees Fahrenheit. For one thing, no metal hitherto commonly
used in aircraft production would stand this temperature, and those
which would do so were for the most part too heavy to be suitable for
the purpose in hand.
(S) During the design phase Lockheed evaluated many materials and
finally chose an alloy of titanium, characterized by great strength,
relatively light weight, and good resistance to high temperatures.
Titanium was also scarce and very costly. Methods for milling it and
controlling the quality of the product were not fully developed. Of the
early deliveries from Titanium Metals Corporation some 80 percent had
to be rejected, and it was not until 1961, when a delegation from
headquarters visited the officials of that company, informed them of
the objectives and high priority of the OXCART program, and gained
their full cooperation, that the supply became consistently
satisfactory.
(S) But this only solved an initial problem. One of the virtues of
titanium was its exceeding hardness, but this very virtue gave rise to
immense difficulties in machining and shaping the material. Drills
which worked well on aluminum soon broke to pieces; new ones had to be
devised. Assembly-line production was impossible; each of the small
OXCART fleet was, so to speak, turned out by hand. The cost of the
program mounted well above original estimates, and it soon began to run
behind schedule. One after another, however, the problems were solved,
and their solution constituted the greatest single technological
achievement of the entire enterprise. Henceforth it became practicable,
if expensive, to build aircraft out of titanium. (S) Since every
additional pound of weight was critical, adequate insulation was out of
the question. The inside of the aircraft would be like a moderately hot
oven. The pilot would have to wear a kind of space suit, with its own
cooling apparatus, pressure control, oxygen supply, and other
necessities for survival. The fuel tanks, which constituted by far the
greater part of the aircraft, would heat up to about 350 degrees, so
that special fuel had to be supplied and the tanks themselves rendered
inert with nitrogen. Lubricating oil was formulated for operation at
600 degrees F., and contained a diluent in order to remain fluid at
operation below 40 degrees. Insulation on the plane's intricate wiring
soon became brittle and useless. During the lifetime of the OXCART no
better insulation was found; the wiring and related connectors had to
be given special attention and handling at great cost in labor and time.
(S) Then there was the unique problem of the camera window. The OXCART
was to carry a delicate and highly sophisticated camera, which would
look out through a quartz glass window. The effectiveness of the whole
system depended upon achieving complete freedom from optical distortion
despite the great heat to which the window would be subjected. Thus the
question was not simply one of providing equipment with resistance to
high temperature, but of assuring that there should be no unevenness of
temperature throughout the area of the window. It took three years of
time and two million dollars of money to arrive at a satisfactory
solution. The program scored one of its most Remarkable successes when
the quartz glass was successfully fused to its metal frame by an
unprecedented process involving the use of high frequency sound waves.
(S) Another major problem of different nature was to achieve the low
radar cross-section desired. The airframe areas giving the greatest
radar return were the vertical stabilizers, the engine inlet, and the
forward side of the engine nacelles. Research in ferrites, high
temperature absorbing materials and high- temperature plastic
structures was undertaken to find methods to reduce the return.
Eventually the vertical tail section fins were constructed from a kind
of laminated "plastic" material-the first time that such a material had
been used for an important part of an aircraft's structure. With such
changes in structural materials, the A-11 was redesignated A-12, and as
such has never been publicly disclosed.
To test the effectiveness of antiradar devices a small-scale model is
inadequate; only a full-size mock-up will do. Lockheed accordingly
built one of these, and as early as November 1959, transported it in a
specially designed trailer truck over hundreds of miles of highway from
the Burbank plant to the test area. Here it was hoisted to the top of a
pylon and looked at from various angles by radar. Tests and adjustments
went on for a year and a half before the results were deemed
satisfactory. In the course of the process it was found desirable to
attach some sizable metallic constructions on each side of the
fuselage, and Kelly Johnson worried a good deal about the effect of
these protuberances on his design. In flight tests, however, it later
developed that they imparted a useful aerodynamic lift to the vehicle,
and years afterward Lockheed's design for a supersonic transport
embodied similar structures.
(S) Pilots for the OXCART would obviously have to be of quite
extraordinary competence, not only because of the unprecedented
performance of the aircraft itself, but also because of the particular
qualities needed in men who were to fly intelligence missions.
Brigadier General Don Flickinger, of the Air Force, was designated to
draw up the criteria for selection, with advice from Kelly Johnson and
from CIA Headquarters. Pilots had to be qualified in the latest high
performance fighters, emotionally stable, and well motivated. They were
to be between 25 and 40 years of age, and the size of the A-12 cockpit
prescribed that they be under six feet tall and under 175 pounds in
weight.
(S) Air Force files were screened for possible candidates and a list of
pilots obtained. Psychological assessments, physical examinations and
refinement of criteria eliminated a good many. Pre-evaluation
processing resulted in sixteen potential nominees. This group underwent
a further intensive security and medical scrutiny by the Agency. Those
who remained were then approached to take employment with the Agency on
a highly classified project involving a very advanced aircraft. In
November 1961, commitments were obtained from five of the group. The
small number recruited at this stage required that a second search be
undertaken.
(S) When the final screening was complete the pilots selected from the
program were William L. Skliar, Kenneth S. Collins, Walter Ray, Lon
Walter, Mele Vojvodich, Jr., Jack W. Weeks, Ronald "Jack" Layton,
Dennis B. Sullivan, David P. Young, Francis J. Murray, and Russell
Scott. After the selection, arrangements were made with the Air Force
to effect appropriate transfers and assignments to cover their training
and to lay the basis for their transition from military to civilian
status. Compensation and insurance arrangements were similar to those
for the U-2 pilots.
(U) One thing to be decided in the earliest stages of the program was
where to base and test the aircraft. Lockheed clearly could not do the
business at Burbank, where the aircraft were being built, if for no
other reason that its runway was too short. The ideal location ought to
be remote from metropolitan areas; well away from civil and military
airways to preclude observation; easily accessible by air; blessed with
good weather the year round; capable of accommodating large numbers of
personnel; equipped with fuel storage facilities; fairly close to an
Air Force installation; and possessing at least an 8,000 foot runway.
There was no such place to be found.
(S) Ten Air Force bases programmed for closure were considered, but
none provided the necessary security, and annual operating costs at
most of them would be unacceptable. Edwards Air Force Base in
California seemed a more likely candidate, but in the end it also was
passed over. Instead a secluded site in Nevada was finally picked. It
was deficient in personnel accommodations and POL storage, and its
long-unused runway was inadequate, but security was good, or could be
made so, and a moderate construction program could provide sufficient
facilities. Lockheed estimated what would be needed in such respects as
monthly fuel consumption, hangars and shop space, housing for
personnel, and runway specifications. Armed with the list of major
requirements, Headquarters came up with a construction and engineering
plan. And in case anyone became curious about what was going on at this
re- mote spot, a cover story stated that the facilities were being
prepared for certain radar studies, to be conducted by an engineering
firm with support from the Air Force. The remote location was explained
as necessary to reduce the effect of electronic interference from
outside sources.
(S) Excellent as it may have been from the point of view of security,
the site at first afforded few of the necessities and none of the
amenities of life. It was far from any metropolitan center. Lockheed
provided a C-47 shuttle service to its plant at Burbank, and a
chartered D-18 (Lodestar) furnished transportation to Las Vegas.
Daily commuting was out of the question, however, and the construction
workers arriving during 1960 were billeted in surplus trailers. A new
water well was dug, and a few recreational facilities provided, but it
was some time before accommodations became agreeable.
(** This footnote did NOT appear in the original document. It is the
method I will use to indicate Marginal notes that were hand written, at
the location of ** in the original document. The Marginal note
states: (1955))
(S) Among the lesser snags, one existed because the laws of Nevada
required the names of all contractor personnel staying in the state for
more than 48 hours to be reported to state authorities. It was
generally felt that to list all these names and identify the companies
involved would be likely to give the whole show away. The Agency's
General Counsel, however, discovered that Government employees were
exempted from these requirements. Thenceforth all contractor personnel
going to the site received appointments as Government consultants, and
if questions were asked the reply could be that no one but government
employees were at this site.
Construction began in earnest in September 1960, and continued on a
double-shift schedule until mid-1964. One of the most urgent tasks was
to build the runway, which according to initial estimates of A-12
requirements must be 8,500 feet long. The existing asphalt runway was
5,000 feet long and incapable of supporting the weight of the A-12. The
new one was built between 7 September and 15 November and involved
pouring over 25,000 yards of concrete. Another major problem was to
provide some 500,000 gallons of PF-1 aircraft fuel per month. Neither
storage facilities nor means of transporting fuel existed. After
considering airlift, pipeline, and truck transport, it was decided that
the last-named was the most economical, and could be made feasible by
resurfacing no more than eighteen miles of highway leading into the
base.
Three surplus Navy hangars were obtained, dismantled, and erected on
the north side of the base. Over 100 surplus Navy housing buildings
were transported to the base and made ready for occupancy. By early
1962 a fuel tank farm was ready, with a capacity of 1,320,000 gallons.
Warehousing and shop space was begun and repairs made to older
buildings. All this, together with the many other facilities that had
to be provided, took a long time to complete. Meanwhile, however, the
really essential facilities were ready in time for the forecast
delivery date of Aircraft No. 1 in August 1961.
(S) The facilities were ready, but the aircraft were not. Originally
promised for delivery at the end of May 1961, the date first slipped to
August, largely because of Lockheed's difficulties in procuring and
fabricating titanium. Moreover, Pratt & Whitney found unexpectedly
great trouble in bringing the J-58 engine up to OXCART requirements. In
March 1961, Kelly Johnson notified Headquarters:
(U) "Schedules are in jeopardy on two fronts. One is the assembly of
the wing and the other is in satisfactory development of the engine.
Our evaluation shows that each of these programs is from three to four
months behind the current schedule.
" (S)To this Bissell replied: (U) "I have learned of your expected
additional delay in first flight from 30 August to 1 December 1961.
This news is extremely shocking on top of our previous slippage from
May to August and my understanding as of our meeting 19 December that
the titanium extrusion problems were essentially overcome. I trust this
is the last of such disappointments short of a severe earthquake in
Burbank.
" (U) Realizing that delays were causing the cost of the program to
soar, Headquarters decided to place a top-level aeronautical engineer
in residence at Lockheed to monitor the program and submit progress
reports.
Delays nevertheless persisted. On 11 September, Pratt and Whitney
informed Lockheed of their continuing difficulties with the J-58 engine
in terms of weight, delivery, and performance. Completion date for
Aircraft No. 1 by now had slipped to 22 December 1961, and the first
flight to 27 February 1962. Even on this last date the J-58 would not
be ready, and it was therefore decided that a Pratt and Whitney J-75
engine, designed for the F-105 and flown in the U-2, should be used for
early flights. The engine, along with other components, could be fitted
to the A-12 airframe, and it could power the aircraft safely to
altitudes up to 50,000 feet and at speeds up to Mach 1.6.
(S) When this decision had been made, final preparations were begun for
the testing phase. In late 1961 Colonel Robert J. Holbury, USAF, was
named Commander of the base, with the Agency employee as his Deputy.
Support aircraft began arriving in the spring of 1962. These included
eight F-101's for training, two T-33's for proficiency flying, a C-130
for cargo transport, a U-3A for administration purposes, a helicopter
for search and rescue, and a Cessna- 180 for liaison use. In addition,
Lockheed provided an F-104 to act as chase aircraft during the A-12
flight test period.
(S) Meanwhile in January 1962, an agreement was reached with the
Federal Aviation Agency that expanded the restricted airspace in the
vicinity of the test area. Certain FAA air traffic controllers were
cleared for the OXCART Project; their function was to insure that
aircraft did not violate the order. The North American Air Defense
Command established procedures to prevent their radar stations from
reporting the appearance of high performance aircraft on their radar
scopes.
(S) Refueling concepts required prepositioning of vast quantities of
fuel at certain points outside the United States. Special tank farms
were programmed in California, Eielson AFB Alaska, Thule AB Greenland,
Kadena AB Okinawa, and Adana, Turkey. Since the A-12 use specially
refined fuel, these tank farms were reserved exclusively for use by the
OXCART Program. Very small detachments of technicians at these
locations maintained the fuel storage facility and arranged for
periodic quality control fuel tests.
(S) At the Lockheed Burbank plant, Aircraft No. 1 (serially numbered
121) received its final tests and checkout during January and February
1962, and was partially disassembled for shipment to the site. It
became clear very early in OXCART planning that because of security
problems and the inadequate runway, the A-12 could not fly from
Burbank. Movement of the full-scale (S)radar test model had been
successfully accomplished in November 1959, as described above. A
thorough survey of the route in June 1961, ascertained the hazards and
problems of moving the actual aircraft, and showed that a package
measuring 35 feet wide and 105 feet long could be transported without
major difficulty. Obstructing road signs had to be removed, trees
trimmed, and some roadsides leveled. Appropriate arrangements were made
with police authorities and local officials to accomplish the safe
transport of the aircraft. The entire fuselage, minus wings, was
crated, covered, and loaded on the special-design trailer, which cost
about $100,000. On 26 February 1962, it departed Burbank, and arrived
at the base according to plan.
(S) First Flights (U) Upon arrival reassembly of the aircraft and
installation of the J-75 engines began. Soon it was found that aircraft
tank sealing compounds had failed to adhere to the metals, and when
fuel was put into the tanks numerous leaks occurred. It was necessary
to strip the tanks of the faulty sealing compounds and reline them with
new materials. Thus occurred one more unexpected and exasperating delay
in the program.
(U) Finally, on 26 April 1962, Aircraft 121 was ready. On that day in
accordance with Kelly Johnson's custom, Louis Schalk took it for an
unofficial, unannounced, maiden flight lasting some 40 minutes. As in
all maiden flights minor problems were detected, but it took only four
more days to ready the aircraft for its first official flight.
(U) On 30 April 1962, just under one year later than originally
planned, the A-12 officially lifted her wheels from the runway. Piloted
again by Louis Schalk, it took off at 170 knots, with a gross weight of
72,000 pounds, and climbed to 30,000 feet. Top speed was 340 knots and
the flight lasted 59 minutes. The pilot reported that the aircraft
responded well and was extremely stable. Kelly Johnson declared it to
be the smoothest official first flight of any aircraft he had designed
or tested. The aircraft broke the sound barrier on its second official
flight, 4 May 1962, reaching Mach 1.1. Again only minor problems were
reported.
(S) With these flights accomplished, jubilation was the order of the
day. The new Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. John McCone, sent a
telegram of congratulation to Kelly Johnson. A critical phase had been
triumphantly passed, but there remained the long, difficult, and
sometimes discouraging process of working the aircraft up to full
operational performance.
Aircraft No. 122 arrived at base on 26 June, and spent three months
in radar testing before engine installations and final assembly.
Aircraft No. 123 arrived in August and flew in October. Aircraft No.
124, a two-seated version intended for use in training project pilots,
was delivered in November. It was to be powered by the J-58 engines,
but delivery delays and a desire to begin pilot training prompted a
decision to install the smaller J-75's. The trainer flew initially in
January 1963. The fifth aircraft, No. 125, arrived at the area on 17
December.
(S) Meanwhile the OXCART program received a shot in the arm from the
Cuban missile crisis. U-2's had been maintaining a regular
reconnaissance vigil over the island, and it was on one of these
missions in October that the presence of offensive missiles was
discovered. Overflights thereafter became more frequent, but on 27
October an Agency U-2, flown by a Strategic Air Force pilot on a
SAC-directed mission, was shot down by a surface-to-air missile. This
raised the dismaying possibility that continued manned, high- altitude
surveillance of Cuba might become out of the question. The OXCART
program suddenly assumed greater significance than ever, and its
achievement of operational status became one of the highest national
priorities.
(S) At the end of 1962 there were two A-12 aircraft engaged in flight
tests. A speed of Mach 2.16 and altitude of 60,000 feet had been
achieved. Progress was still slow, however, because of delays in the
delivery of engines and shortcomings in the performance of those
delivered. One of the two test aircraft was still flying with two J-75
engines, and the other with one J-75 and one J-58. It had long since
become clear that Pratt & Whitney had been too optimistic in their
forecast; the problem of developing the J-58 up to OXCART
specifications had proved a good deal more recalcitrant than expected.
Mr. McCone judged the situation to be truly serious, and on 3 December
he wrote to the President of United Aircraft Corporation.
(U) "I have been advised that J-58 engine deliveries have been delayed
again due to engine control production problems....By the end of the
year it appears we will have barely enough J-58 engines to support the
flight test program adequately....Furthermore, due to various engine
difficulties we have not yet reached design speed and altitude. Engine
thrust and fuel consumption deficiencies at present prevent sustained
flight at design conditions which is so necessary to complete
developments.
" (U) By the end of January 1963, ten engines were available, and the
first flight with two of them installed occurred on 15 January.
Thenceforth all A-12 aircraft were fitted with their intended
propulsion system. Flight testing accelerated and contractor personnel
went to a three-shift work day.
(U) With each succeeding step into a high Mach regime new problems
presented themselves. The worst of all these difficulties-indeed one of
the most formidable in the entire history of the program-was revealed
when flight testing moved into speeds between Mach 2.4 and 2.8, and the
aircraft experienced such severe roughness as to make its operation
virtually out of the question. The trouble was diagnosed as being in
the air inlet system, which with its controls admitted air to the
engine. At the higher speeds the flow of air was uneven, and the engine
therefore could not function properly. Only after a long period of
experimentation, often highly frustrating and irritating, was a
solution reached. This further postponed the day when the A-12 could be
declared operationally ready.
(U) Among more mundane troubles was the discovery that various nuts,
bolts, clamps, and other debris of the manufacturing process had not
been cleared ** away, and upon engine run-up or take-off were sucked
into the engine. The engine parts were machined to such close
tolerances that they could be ruined in this fashion. Obviously the
fault was due to sheer carelessness. Inspection procedures were
revised, and it was also found prudent at Burbank to hoist the engine
nacelles into the air, rock them back and forth, listen for loose
objects, and then remove them by hand.
(** This footnote did NOT appear in the original document. It is the
method I will use to indicate Marginal notes that were hand written, at
the location of ** in the original document. The Marginal note
states: hasn't changed)
(S) While on a routine flight, 24 May 1963, one of the detachment
pilots recognized an erroneous and confusing air speed indication and
decided to eject from the aircraft, which crashed 14 miles south of
Wendover, Utah. The pilot Kenneth Collins, was unhurt. The wreckage was
recovered in two days, and persons at the scene were identified and
requested to sign secrecy agreements. A cover story for the press
described the accident as occurring to a F-105, and is still listed in
this way on official records.
(U) All A-12 aircraft were grounded for a week during investigation of
the accident. A plugged pitot static tube in icing conditions turned
out to be responsible for the faulty cockpit instrument indications-it
was not some- thing which would hold things up for long. (S) Loss of
this aircraft nevertheless precipitated a policy problem which had been
troubling the Agency for some time. With the growing number of A-12's,
how much longer could the project remain secret? The program had gone
through development, construction, and a year of flight testing without
attracting public attention. But the Department of Defense was having
difficulty in concealing its participation because of the increasing
rate of expenditures, otherwise unexplained. There was also a
realization that the technological data would be extremely valuable in
connection with feasibility studies for the SST. Finally, there was a
growing awareness in the higher reaches of the aircraft industry that
something new and Remarkable was going on. Rumors spread, and gossip
flew about. Commercial airline crews sighted the OXCART in flight. The
editor of Aviation Week (as might be expected) indicated his knowledge
of developments at Burbank. The secrecy was thinning out.
(S) The President's Announcement
(U) In spite of all this, 1963 went by without any public revelation.
President Johnson was brought up to date on the project a week after
taking office, and directed that a paper be prepared for an
announcement in the spring of 1964. Then at his press conference on 24
February, he read a statement of which the first paragraph was as
follows:
(U) "The United States has successfully developed an advanced
experimental jet aircraft, the A-11, which has been tested in sustained
flight at more than 2,000 miles per hour and at altitudes in excess of
70,000 feet. The performance of the A-11 far exceeds that of any other
aircraft in the world today. The development of this aircraft has been
made possible by major advances in aircraft technology of great
significance for both military and commercial applications. Several
A-11 aircraft are now being flight tested at Edwards Air Force Base in
California. The existence of this program is being disclosed today to
permit the orderly exploitation of this advanced technology in our
military and commercial program.
" (U) The president went on to mention the "mastery of the metallurgy
and fabrication of titanium metal" which has been achieved, gave credit
to Lockheed and to Pratt & Whitney, Remarked that appropriate
members of the Senate and House had been kept fully informed, and
prescribed that the detailed performance of the A-11 would be kept
strictly classified. (S) The President's reference to the "A-11" was of
course deliberate. "A-11" had been the original design designation for
the all-metal aircraft first proposed by Lockheed; subsequently it
became the design designation for the Air Force YF-12A interceptor
which differed from its parent mainly in that it carried a second man
for launching air-to-air missiles. To preserve the distinction between
the A-11 and the A-12 Security had briefed practically all
participating personnel in government and industry on the impending
announcement. OXCART secrecy continued in effect. There was
considerable speculation about an Agency role in the A-11 development,
but it was never acknowledged by the government. News headlines ranged
from "US has dozen A-11 jets already flying" to "Secret of sizzling new
plane probably history's best kept.
" (U) The President also said that "the A-11 aircraft now at Edwards
Air Force Base are undergoing extensive tests to determine their
capabilities as long- range interceptors." It was true that the Air
Force in October 1960, had contracted for three interceptor versions of
the A-12, and they were by this time available. But at the moment when
the President spoke, there were no A-11's at Edwards and there never
had been. Project officials had known that the public announcement was
about to be made, but they had not been told exactly when. Caught by
surprise, they hastily flew two Air Force YF-12A's to Edwards to
support the President's statement. So rushed was this operation, so
speedily were the aircraft put into hangars upon arrival, that heat
from them activated the hangar sprinkler system, dousing the reception
team which awaited them.
(S) Thenceforth, while the OXCART continued its secret career at its
own site, the A-11 performed at Edwards Air Force Base in a
considerable glare of publicity. Pictures of the aircraft appeared in
the press, correspondents could look at it and Marvel, stories could be
written. Virtually no details were made available, but the technical
journals nevertheless had a field day. The unclassified Air Force and
Space Digest, for example, published a long article in its issue of
April 1964, commencing: "The official pictures and statements tell very
little about the A-11. But the technical literature from open sources,
when carefully interpreted, tells a good deal about what it could and,
more importantly, what it could not be. Here's the story ...
" (S) Going Operational
(U) Three years and seven months after first flight in April 1962 the
OXCART was declared ready for operational use at design specifications.
The period thus devoted to flight tests was remarkable short,
considering the new fields of aircraft performance which were being
explored. As each higher Mach number was reached exhaustive tests were
carried out in accordance with standard procedures to ensure that the
aircraft functioned properly and safely. Defects were corrected and
improvements made. All concerned gained experience with the particular
characteristics and idiosyncrasies of the vehicle.
(S) The air inlet and related control continued for a long time to
present the most troublesome and refractory problem. Numerous attempts
failed to find a remedy, even though a special task force concentrated
on the task. For a time there was something approaching despair, and
the solution when finally achieved was greeted with enormous relief.
After all, not every experimental aircraft of advanced performance has
survived its flight testing period. The possibility existed that OXCART
also would fail, despite the great cost and effort expended upon it.
(S) A few dates and figures will serve to Mark the progress of events.
By the end of 1963 there had been 573 flights totaling 765 hours. Nine
aircraft were in the inventory. On 20 July 1963 test aircraft flew for
the first time at Mach 3; in November Mach 3.2 (the design speed) was
reached at 78,000 feet altitude. The longest sustained flight at design
conditions occurred on 3 February 1964; it lasted to ten minutes at
Mach 3.2 and 83,000 feet. By the end of 1964 there had been 1,160
flights, totaling 1,616 hours. Eleven aircraft were then available,
four of them reserved for testing and seven assigned to the detachment.
The record may be put in another way. Mach 2 was reached after six
months of flying; Mach 3 after 15 months. Two years after the first
flight the aircraft had flown a total of 38 hours at Mach 2, three
hours at Mach 2.6, and less than one hour at Mach 3. After three years,
Mach 2 time had increased to 60 hours, Mach 2.6 time to 33 hours, and
Mach 3 time to nine hours; all Mach 3 time, however, was by test
aircraft, and detachment aircraft were still restricted to mach 2.9.
(S) As may be seen from the figures, most flights were of short
duration, averaging little more than an hour each. Primarily this was
because longer flights were unnecessary at this stage of testing. It
was also true, however, that the less seen of OXCART the better, and
short flights helped to preserve the secrecy of the proceedings. Yet it
was virtually impossible for an aircraft of such dimensions and
capabilities to remain inconspicuous. At its full speed OXCART had a
turning radius of no less than 86 miles. There was no question of
staying close to the airfield; its shortest possible flights took it
over a very large expanse of territory.
(S) The first long-range, high-speed flight occurred on 27 January
1965, when one of the test aircraft flew for an hour and forty minutes,
with an hour and fifteen minutes above Mach 3.1. Its total range was
2,580 nautical miles, with altitudes between 75,600 and 80,000 feet.
(U) Two more aircraft were lost during this phase of the program. On 9
July 1964 Aircraft No. 133 was making its final approach to the runway
when at altitude of 500 feet and airspeed of 200 knots it began a
smooth steady roll to the left. Lockheed test pilot Bill Park could not
overcome the roll. At about a 45 degree bank angle and 200 foot
altitude he ejected. As he swung down to the vertical in the parachute
his feet touched the ground, for what must have been one of the
narrower escapes in the perilous history of test piloting. The Primary
cause of the accident was that the servo for the right outboard roll
and pitch control froze. No news of the accident filtered out.
(S) On 28 December 1965 Aircraft No. 126 crashed immediately after
take- off and was totally destroyed. Detachment pilot Mele Vojvodich
ejected safely at an altitude of 150 feet. The accident investigation
board determined that a flight line electrician had improperly
connected the yaw and pitch gyros-had in effect reversed the controls.
This time Mr. McCone directed the Office of Security to conduct an
investigation into the possibility of sabotage. While nothing of the
sort was discovered, there were indications of negligence, as the
manufacturer of the gyro had earlier warned of the possibility that the
mechanism could be connected in reverse. No action had been taken,
however, even by such an elementary precaution as painting the contacts
different colors. Again there was no publicity connected with the
accident.
(S) The year 1965 saw the test site reach the high point of activity.
Completion of construction brought it to full physical size. All
detachment pilots were Mach 3.0 qualified. Site population reached
1,835. Contractors were working three shifts a day. Lockheed
Constellations made daily flights between the factory at Burbank and
the site. Two C-47 flights a day were made between the site and Las
Vegas. And officials were considering how and when and where to use
OXCART in its appointed role.
(S) Targeting the OX
(S) After the unhappy end of U-2 flights over the Soviet Union, US
political authorities were understandably cautious about committing
themselves to further manned reconnaissance over unfriendly territory.
There was no serious intention to use the OXCART over Russia; save in
some unforeseeable emergency it was indeed no longer necessary to do
so. What then, should be done with this vehicle?
(S) The first interest was in Cuba. By early 1964 Project Headquarters
began planning for the contingency of flights over that island under a
program designated SKYLARK. Bill Park's accident in early July held
this program up for a time, but on 5 August Acting DCI Marshall S.
Carter directed that SKYLARK achieve emergency operational readiness by
5 November. This involved preparing a small detachment which should be
able to do the job over Cuba, though at something less than the full
design capability of the OXCART. The goal was to operate at Mach 2.8
and 80,000 feet altitude.
In order to meet the deadline set by General Carter, camera
performance would have to be validated, pilots qualified for Mach 2.8
flight, and coordination with supporting elements arranged. Only one of
several installations for electronic countermeasures (ECM) would be
ready by November, and a senior intra-governmental group, including
representation from the President's Scientific Advisory Committee,
examined the problem of operating over Cuba without the full complement
of defensive systems. This panel decided that the first few overflights
could safely be conducted without them, but the ECM would be necessary
thereafter. The delivery schedule of ECM equipment was compatible with
this course of action.
(S) After considerable modifications to aircraft, the detachment
simulated Cuban missions on training flights, and a limited emergency
SKYLARK capability was announced on the date General Carter had set.
With two weeks notice the OXCART detachment could accomplish a Cuban
overflight, though with fewer ready aircraft and pilots than had been
planned.
(S) During the following weeks the detachment concentrated on
developing SKYLARK into a sustained capability, with five ready pilots
and five operational aircraft. The main tasks were to determine
aircraft range and fuel consumption, attain repeatable reliable
operation, finish pilot training, prepare a family of SKYLARK missions,
and coordinate routes with North American Air Defense, Continental Air
Defense, and the Federal Aviation Authority. All this was accomplished
without substantially hindering the main task of working up OXCART to
full design capability. We may anticipate the story, however, by
remarking that despite all this preparation the OXCART was never used
over Cuba. U-2's proved adequate, and the A-12 was reserved for more
critical situations.
(S) In 1965 a more critical situation did indeed emerge in Asia, and
interest in using the aircraft there began to be manifest. On 18 March
1965 Mr. McCone discussed with Secretaries McNamara and Vance the
increasing hazards to U-2 and drone reconnaissance of Communist China.
A memorandum of this conversation stated:
(S) "It was further agreed that we should proceed immediately with all
preparatory steps necessary to operate the OXCART over Communist China,
flying out of Okinawa. It was agreed that we should proceed with all
construction and related arrangements. However, this decision did not
authorize the deployment of the OXCART to Okinawa nor the decision to
fly the OXCART over Communist China. The decision would authorize all
preparatory steps and the expenditure of such funds as might be
involved. No decision has been taken to fly the OXCART operationally
over Communist China. This decision can only be made by the President."
(S) Four days later Brigadier General Jack C. Ledford, Director of the
Office of Special Activities, DD/S&T, briefed Mr. Vance on the
scheme which had been drawn up for operations in the Far East. The
project was called BLACK SHIELD, and it called for the OXCART to
operate out of the Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa. In the first
phase, three aircraft would stage to Okinawa for 60-day periods, twice
a year, with about 225 personnel involved.
(S) After this was in good order, BLACK SHIELD would advance to the
point of maintaining a permanent detachment at Kadena. Secretary Vance
made $3.7 million available to be spent in providing support facilities
on the island, which were to be available by early fall of 1965.
(S) Meanwhile the Communists began to deploy surface-to-air missiles
around Hanoi, thereby threatening our current military reconnaissance
capabilities. Secretary McNamara called this to the attention of the
Under Secretary of the Air Force on 3 June 1965, and inquired about the
practicability of substituting OXCART aircraft for U-2's. He was told
that BLACK SHIELD could operate over Vietnam as soon as adequate
aircraft performance was achieved. (S) With deployment overseas thus
apparently impending in the fall, the detachment went into the final
stages of its program for validating the reliability of aircraft and
aircraft systems. It set out to demonstrate complete systems
reliability at Mach 3.05 and at 2,300 nautical miles range, with
penetration altitude of 76,000 feet. A demonstrated capability for
three aerial refuelings was also part of the validation process.
(S) By this time the OXCART was well along in performance. The inlet,
camera, hydraulic, navigation, and flight control systems all
demonstrated acceptable reliability. Nevertheless, as longer flights
were conducted at high speeds and high temperatures, new problems came
to the surface, the most serious being with the electrical wiring
system. Wiring connectors and components had to withstand temperatures
of more than 800 degrees Fahrenheit, together with structural flexing,
vibration, and shock. Continuing malfunctions in the inlet controls,
communications equipment, ECM systems, and cockpit instruments were in
many cases attributable to wiring failures. There was also disturbing
evidence that careless handling was contributing to electrical
connector failures. Difficulties persisted in the sealing of fuel
tanks. What with one thing and another, officials soon began to fear
that the scheduled date for BLACK SHIELD readiness would not be met.
Prompt corrective action on the part of Lockheed was in order. The
quality of maintenance needed drastic improvement. The responsibility
for delivering an aircraft system with acceptable reliability to meet
an operational commitment lay in Lockheed's hands.
(S) In this uncomfortable situation, John Paragosky, Deputy for
Technology, OSA, went to the Lockheed plant to see Kelly Johnson on 3
August 1965. A frank discussion ensued on the measures necessary to
insure that BLACK SHIELD commitments would be met, and Johnson
concluded that he should himself spend full time at the site in order
to get the job done expeditiously. Lockheed President Daniel Haughton
offered the full support of the corporation, and Johnson began duty at
the site next day. His firm and effective management got Project BLACK
SHIELD back on schedule.
(S) Four primary BLACK SHIELD aircraft were selected and final
validation flights conducted. During these tests the OXCART achieved a
maximum speed of Mach 3.29, altitude of 90,000 feet, and sustained
flight time above Mach 3.2 of one hour and fourteen minutes. The
maximum endurance flight lasted six hours and twenty minutes. The last
stage was reached on 20 November 1965, and two days later Kelly Johnson
wrote General Ledford:
(S) " ... Over-all, my considered opinion is that the aircraft can be
successfully deployed for the BLACK SHIELD mission with what I would
consider to be at least as low a degree of risk as in the early U-2
deployment days. Actually, considering our performance level of more
than four times the U-2 speed and three miles more operating altitude,
it is probably much less risky than our first U-2 deployment. I think
the time has come when the bird should leave its nest."
(S) Ten days later the 303 Committee received a formal proposal that
OXCART be deployed to the Far East. The Committee, after examining the
matter, did not approve. It did agree, however, that short of actually
moving aircraft to Kadena all steps should be taken to develop and
maintain a quick reaction capability, ready to deploy within a 21-day
period at any time after 1 January 1966.
(S) There the matter remained, for more than a year. During 1966 there
were frequent renewals of the request to the 303 Committee for
authorization to deploy OXCART to Okinawa and conduct reconnaissance
missions over North Vietnam, Communist China, or both. All were turned
down. Among high officials there was difference of opinion; CIA, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Presidents Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board favored the move, while Alexis Johnson representing State, and
Defense in the persons of Messrs. McNamara and Vance, opposed it. The
proponents urged the necessity of better intelligence, especially on a
possible Chinese Communist build-up preparatory to intervention in
Vietnam. The opponents felt that better intelligence was not so
urgently needed as to justify the political risks of basing the
aircraft in Okinawa and thus almost certainly disclosing to Japanese
and other propagandists. They also believed it undesirable to use
OXCART and reveal something of its capability until a more pressing
requirement appeared. At least once, on 12 August 1966, the divergent
views were brought up to the President, who confirmed the 303
Committee's majority opinion against deployment.
(S) Meanwhile, of course, flight testing and crew proficiency training
continued. There was plenty of time to improve mission plans and flight
tactics, as well as to prepare the forward area at Kadena. New plans
shortened deployment time from the 21 days first specified. Personnel
and cargo were to be airlifted to Kadena the day deployment was
approved. On the fifth day the first OXCART would depart and travel the
6,673 miles in five hours and 34 minutes. The second would go on the
seventh and the third on the ninth day. The first two would be ready
for an emergency mission on the eleventh day, and for a normal mission
on the fifteenth day.
(S) An impressive demonstration of the OXCART capability occurred on 21
December 1966 when Lockheed test pilot Bill Park flew 10,198 statute
miles in six hours. The aircraft left the test area in Nevada and flew
northward over Yellowstone National Park, thence eastward to Bismarck,
North Dakota, and on to Duluth, Minnesota. It then turned south and
passed Atlanta en route to Tampa, Florida, then northwest to Portland,
Oregon, then southwest to Nevada. Again the flight turned eastward,
passing Denver and St. Louis. Turning around at Knoxville, Tennessee,
it passed Memphis in the home stretch back to Nevada. This flight
established a record unapproachable by any other aircraft; it began at
about the same time a typical government employee starts his work day
and ended two hours before his quitting time. *
(S) Shortly after this exploit, tragedy befell the program. During a
routine training flight on 5 January 1967, the fourth aircraft was
lost, together with its pilot. The accident occurred during descent
about 70 miles from the base. A fuel gauge failed to function properly,
and the aircraft ran out of fuel only minutes before landing. The
pilot, Walter Ray, ejected but was killed when he failed to separate
from the ejection seat before impact. The aircraft was totally
destroyed. Its wreckage was found on 6 January and Ray's body recovered
a day later. Through Air Force channels a story was released to the
effect that an Air Force SR-71, on a routine test flight out of Edwards
Air Force Base, was missing and presumed down in Nevada. The pilot was
identified as a civilian test pilot, and the newspapers connected him
with Lockheed. Flight activity at the base was again suspended during
investigation of the causes both for the crash and for the failure of
the seat separation device.
(S) It is worth observing that none of the four accidents occurred in
the high-Mach-number, high-temperature regime of flight. All involved
traditional problems inherent in any aircraft. In fact, the OXCART was
by this time performing at high speeds, with excellent reliability.
(S) BLACK SHIELD
(S) About May
of 1967 prospects for deployment
took a new turn. A good deal of apprehension was evident in Washington
about the possibility that the Communists might introduce
surface-to-surface missiles into North Vietnam, and concern was
aggravated by doubts as to whether we could detect such a development
if it occurred. The President asked for a proposal on the matter; CIA
briefed the 303 Committee and once again suggested that the OXCART be
used. Its camera was far superior to those on drones or on the U-2, its
vulnerability was far less. The State and Defense members of the
Committee decided to re-examine the requirements and the political
risks involved. While they were engaged in their deliberations,
Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, submitted to the 303
Committee another formal proposal to deploy the OXCART. In addition, he
raised the matter at President Johnson's "Tuesday lunch" on 16 May, and
received the Presidents approval to "go." Walt Rostow later in the day
formally conveyed the President's decision, and the BLACK SHIELD
deployment plan was forthwith put into effect.
(S) On 17 May airlift to Kadena began. On 22 May the first A-12 (Serial
No. 131) flew nonstop to Kadena in six hours and six minutes. Aircraft
No. 127
(S) * Neither on this nor on other flights was there much trouble from
sonic boom. To be sure, the inhabitants of a small village some 30
miles from the site were troubled as the aircraft broke through the
sound barrier while gaining altitude. A change of course remedied this.
At altitude OXCART produced no more than an ominous rumble on the
ground and since the plane was in- visible to the naked eye no one
associated this sound with its actual source.
departed on 24 May and arrived at Kadena five hours and 55 minutes
later. The third, No. 129, left according to plan on 26 May 1967 and
proceeded normally until in the vicinity of Wake Island where the pilot
experienced difficulties with the inertial navigation and
communications systems. In the circumstances, he decided to make a
precautionary landing at Wake Island. The prepositioned emergency
recovery team secured the aircraft without incident and the flight to
Kadena resumed next day.
Arrangements were made to brief the Ambassadors and Chiefs of Station
in the Philippines, Formosa, Thailand, South Vietnam, and Japan, and
the High Commissioner and Chief of Station, Okinawa. The Prime
Ministers of Japan and Thailand were advised, as were the President and
Defense Minister of the Republic of China. The Chiefs of the Air Force
of Thailand and the Republic of China were also briefed. Reactions were
favorable.
(S) On 29 May 1967, the unit at Kadena was ready to fly an operational
mission. Under the command of Colonel Hugh C. Slater two hundred and
sixty personnel had deployed to the BLACK SHIELD facility. Except for
hangars, which were a month short of completion, everything was in
shape for sustained operations. Next day the detachment was alerted for
a mission on 31 May, and the moment arrived which would see the
culmination of ten years of effort, worry, and cost. As fate would have
it, on the morning of the 31st heavy rain fell at Kadena. Since weather
over the target area was clear, preparations continued in hopes that
the local weather would clear. When the time for take-off approached,
the OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the
runway, and took off while the rain continued.
(S) The first BLACK SHIELD mission followed one flight line over North
Vietnam and one over the Demilitarized Zone. It lasted three hours and
39 minutes, and the cruise legs were flown at Mach 3.1 and 80,000 feet.
Results were satisfactory. Seventy of the 190 known SAM sites in North
Vietnam were photographed, as were nine other priority targets. There
were no radar signals detected, indicating that the first mission had
gone completely unnoticed by both Chinese and North Vietnamese.
(S) Fifteen BLACK SHIELD missions were alerted during the period from
31 May to 15 August 1967. Seven of the fifteen were flown and of these
four detected radar tracking signals, but no hostile action was taken
against any of them. By mid-July they had deterred with a high degree
of confidence that there were no surface-to-surface missiles in North
Vietnam.
All operational missions were planned, directed, and controlled by
Project Headquarters in Washington. A constant watch was maintained on
the weather in the target areas. Each day at a specified hour (1600
hours local) a mission alert briefing occurred. If the forecast weather
appeared favorable, the Kadena base was alerted and provided a route to
be flown. The alert pre- ceded actual take-off by 28 to 30 hours.
Twelve hours prior to take-off (H minus 12) a second review of target
weather was made. If it continued favorable, the mission generation
sequence continued. At H minus 2 hours, a "go-no-go" decision was made
and communicated to the field. The final decision, it should be noted,
depended not solely on weather in the target area; conditions had to be
propitious also in the refueling areas and at the launch and recovery
base.
(S) Operations and maintenance at Kadena began with the receipt of
alert notification. Both a Primary aircraft and pilot and a back-up
aircraft and pilot were selected. The aircraft were given thorough
inspection and servicing, all systems were checked, and the cameras
loaded into the aircraft. Pilots received a detailed route briefing in
the early evening prior to the day of flight. On the morning of the
flight a final briefing occurred, at which time the condition of the
aircraft and its systems was reported, last-minute weather forecasts
reviewed, and other relevant intelligence communicated together with
any amendments or changes in the flight plan. Two hours prior to take-
off the Primary pilot had a medical examination, got into his suit, and
was taken to the aircraft. If any malfunctions developed on the Primary
aircraft, the back-up could execute the mission one hour later.
(S) A typical route profile for a BLACK SHIELD mission over North
Vietnam included a refueling shortly after take-off, south of Okinawa,
the planned photographic pass or passes, withdrawal to a second aerial
refueling in the Thailand area, and return to Kadena. So great was the
OXCART speed that it spent only 12 1/2 minutes over North Vietnam in a
typical "single pass" mission, or a total of 21 1/2 minutes on two
passes. Its turning radius of 86 miles was such, however, that on some
mission profiles it might be forced during its turn to intrude into
Chinese airspace.
(S) Once landed back at Kadena, the camera film was removed from the
aircraft, boxed, and sent by special plane to the processing
facilities. Film from earlier missions was developed at the Eastman
Kodak plant in Rochester, New York. By late summer an Air Force Center
in Japan carried out the processing in order to place the
photointelligence in the hands of American commanders in Vietnam within
24 hours of completion of a BLACK SHIELD mission.
(S) Between 16 August and 31 December 1967, twenty-six missions were
alerted. Fifteen were flown. On 17 December one SAM site tracked the
vehicle with its acquisition radar but was unsuccessful with its Fan
Song guidance radar. On 28 October a North Vietnamese SAM site for the
first time launched a single, albiet unsuccessful, missile at the
OXCART. Photography from this mission documented the event with
photographs of missile smoke above the SAM firing site, and with
pictures of the missile and of its contrail. Electronic countermeasures
equipment appeared to perform well against the missile firing.
(S) During the flight of 30 October 1967, pilot Dennis Sullivan
detected radar tracking on his first pass over North Vietnam. Two sites
prepared to launch missiles but neither did. During the second pass at
least six missiles were fired at the OXCART, each confirmed by missile
vapor trails on mission photography. Sullivan saw these vapor trails
and witnessed three missile detonations. Post-flight inspection of the
aircraft revealed that a piece of metal had penetrated the lower right
wing fillet area and lodged against the support structure of the wing
tank. The fragment was not a warhead pellet but may have been a part of
the debris from one of the missile detonations observed by the pilot.
(S) Between 1 January and 31 March 1968 six missions were flown out of
fifteen alerted. Four of these were over North Vietnam and two over
North Korea. The first mission over North Korea on 26 January occurred
during a very tense period following seizure of the Pueblo on the 23rd.
The aim was to discover whether the North Koreans were preparing any
large scale hostile move on the heels of this incident. Chinese
tracking of the flight was apparent, but no missiles were fired at the
plane.
The Department of State was reluctant to endorse a second mission
over North Korea for fear of the diplomatic repercussions which could
be expected if the aircraft came down in hostile territory. Brigadier
General Paul Bacalis then briefed Secretary Rusk on the details and
objectives of the mission, and assured him that the aircraft would
transit North Korea in no more than seven minutes. He explained that
even if some failure occurred during flight the aircraft would be
highly unlikely to land either in North Korea or in China. Secretary
Rusk made suggestions to alter the flight plan, thus becoming the
projects highest ranking flight planner.
(S) Between 1 April and 9 June 1968 two missions were alerted for North
Korea. Only the mission which flew on 8 May was granted approval.
(S) The SR-71
(S) All through
the OXCART program the Air Force had
been exceedingly helpful. it gave financial support, conducted the
refueling program, provided operational facilities at Kadena, and
air-lifted OXCART personnel and supplies to Okinawa for the operations
over Vietnam and North Korea. It also ordered from Lockheed a small
fleet of A-11's, which upon being finished as two seated reconnaissance
aircraft would be named SR-71. These would become operational about
1967.
(S) The stated mission of the SR-71 was to conduct "post-strike
reconnaissance," that is, to look the enemy situation over after a
nuclear exchange. The likelihood of using the aircraft in the capacity
hardly appeared great, but SR-71 was of course also capable of ordinary
intelligence missions. For these purposes, however, the OXCART
possessed certain clear advantages. It carried only one man, and
largely for this reason it had room for a much bigger and better
camera, as well as for various other collection devices which at the
time could not be carried by the SR-71. It was certainly the most
effective reconnaissance aircraft in existence, or likely to be in
existence for years to come. Also it was operated by civilians, and
could be employed covertly, or at least without the number of personnel
and amount of fanfare normally attending an Air Force operation.
(S) The fact the SR-71's were ordered eased the path of OXCART
development, since it meant that the financial burden was shared with
the Air Force, and the cost per aircraft was somewhat reduced by
producing greater numbers. In the longer run, however, the existence of
SR-71 spelled the doom of OXCART, for reasons which appear to have been
chiefly financial and in a manner now to be related.
(S) Ending
(S) During November 1965, the very month when OXCART was finally
declared operational, the moves toward its demise commenced. Within the
Bureau of the Budget a memorandum was circulated expressing concern at
the costs of the A-12 and SR-71 programs, both past and projected. It
questioned the requirement for the total number of aircraft represented
in the combined fleets, and doubted the necessity for a separate CIA
(OXCART) fleet. Several alternatives were proposed to achieve a
substantial reduction in the forecasted spending, but the recommended
course was to phase out the A-12 program by September 1966 and stop any
further procurement of SR-71 aircraft. Copies of this memorandum were
sent to the Department of Defense and the CIA with the suggestion that
those agencies explore the alternatives set out in the paper. But the
Secretary of Defense declined to consider the proposal, presumably
because the SR-71 would not be operational by September 1966.
(S) Things remained in this state until in July 1966 the Bureau of the
Budget proposed that a study group be established to look into the
possibility of reducing expenses on the OXCART and SR-71 programs. The
group was requested to consider the following alternatives:
1. Retention of separate A-12 and SR-71 fleets, i.e., status quo.
2. Collocation of the two fleets.
3. Transfer of the OXCART mission and aircraft to SAC.
4. Transfer of the OXCART mission to SAC and storage of A-12 aircraft.
5. Transfer of the OXCART mission to SAC and disposal of A-12 aircraft.
(S)The study group included C. W. Fischer, Bureau of the Budget;
Herbert Bennington, Department of Defense; and John Paragosky, Central
Intelligence Agency.
(S) This group conducted its study through the fall of 1966, and
identified three principal alternatives of its own. They were:
1. To maintain the status quo and continue both fleets at current
approval levels.
2. To mothball all A-12 aircraft, but maintain the OXCART capability by
sharing SR-71 aircraft between SAC and CIA.
3. To terminate the OXCART fleet in January 1968 (assuming an
operational readiness date of September 1967 for the SR-71) and assign
all missions to the SR-71 fleet.
(S) On 12
December 1966 there was a meeting at the
Bureau of the Budget attended by Mr. Helms, Mr. Shultze, Mr. Vance, and
Dr. Hornig, Scientific Advisor to the President. Those present voted on
the alternatives proposed in the Fischer-Bennington-Paragosky report.
Messrs. Vance, Schultze, and Hornig chose to terminate the OXCART
fleet, and Mr. Helms stood out for eventual sharing of the SR-71 fleet
between CIA and SAC. The Bureau of the Budget immediately prepared a
letter to the President setting forth the course of action recommended
by the majority. Mr. Helms, having dissented from the majority,
requested his Deputy Director for Science and Technology to prepare a
letter to the President stating CIA's reasons for remaining in the
reconnaissance business.
(S) On 16 December Mr. Schultze
handed Mr. Helms a draft memorandum to
the President which requested a decision either to share the SR-71
fleet between CIA and SAC, or to terminate the CIA capability entirely.
This time Mr. Helms replied that new information of considerable
significance had been brought to his attention concerning SR-71
performance. He requested another meeting after 1 January to review
pertinent facts, and also asked that the memorandum to the President be
withheld pending that meeting's outcome. Specifically, he cited
indications that the SR-71 program was having serious technical
problems and that there was real doubt that it would achieve an
operational capability by the time suggested for termination of the
A-12 program. Mr. Helms therefore changed his position from sharing the
SR-71 aircraft with SAC to a firm recommendation to retain the OXCART
A-12 fleet under civilian sponsorship. The Budget Bureau's memorandum
was nevertheless transmitted to the President, who on 28 December 1966
accepted the recommendations of Messrs. Vance, Hornig, and Schultze,
and directed the termination of the OXCART Program by 1 January 1968.
(S) This decision meant that a
schedule had to be developed for orderly
phase-out. After consultation with project Headquarters, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense was advised on 10 January 1967 that four A-12's
would be placed in storage in July 1967, two more by December, and the
last four by the end of January 1968. In May Mr. Vance directed that
the SR-71 assume contingency responsibility to conduct Cuban
overflights as of 1 July 1967 and take over the dual capability over
Southeast Asia and Cuba by 1 December 1967. This provided for some
overlap between OXCART withdrawal and SR-71 assumption of
responsibility.
(S) Meanwhile until 1 July 1967
the OXCART Detachment was to maintain
its capability to conduct operational missions both from a prepared
location overseas and from the US. This included a 15 day quick
reaction capability for deployment to the Far East and a seven-day
quick reaction for deployment over Cuba. Between 1 July and 31 December
1967 the fleet would remain able to conduct operational missions either
from a prepared overseas base or from home base, but not from both
simultaneously. A quick reaction capability for either Cuban
overflights or deployment to the Far East would also be maintained.
(S) All these transactions and
arrangements occurred before the OXCART
had conducted a single operational mission or even deployed to Kadena
for such a mission. As recounted above, the aircraft first performed
its appointed role over North Vietnam on the last day of May 1967. In
succeeding months it demonstrated both its exceptional technical
capabilities and the competence with which its operations were managed.
As word began to get around that OXCART was to be phased out, high
officials commenced to feel some disquiet. Concern was shown by Walt
Rostow, the President's Special Assistant; by key Congressional
figures, members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board, and the President's Scientific Advisory Commit- tee. The
phase-out lagged, and the question was reopened.
(S) A new study of the
feasibility and cost of continuing the OXCART
program was completed in the spring of 1968 and four new alternatives
were proposed.
1. Transfer all OXCART aircraft
to SAC by 31 October 1968; substitute
Air Force for contractor support where possible; turn the test A-12
aircraft over to the SR-71 test facility.
2. Transfer OXCART as in
alternative 1, above, and store eight SR-71's.
3. Close the OXCART home base
and collocate the fleet with SR-71's at
Beale Air Force Base in California, but with CIA retaining control and
management.
4. Continue OXCART operations
at its own base under CIA control and
management.
(S) Mr. Helms expressed his
reactions to these alternatives in a
memorandum to Messrs. Nitze, Hornig, and Flax, dated 18 April 1968. In
it he questioned why, if eight SR-71's could be stored in one option,
they could not be stored in all the options, with the resultant savings
applied in each case. He questioned the lower cost figures of combining
the OXCART with the SR-71's and disagreed, for security reasons, with
collocating the two fleets. Above all, however, he felt that the key
point was the desirability of retaining a covert reconnaissance
capability under civilian management. It was his judgment that such a
requirement existed, and he recommended that OXCART continue at its own
base under CIA management.
(S) In spite of all these
belated efforts, the Secretary of Defense on
16 May 1968 reaffirmed the original decision to terminate the OXCART
Program and store the aircraft. At his weekly luncheon with his
principal advisors on 21 May 1968, the President confirmed Secretary
Clifford's decision.
(S) Early in March 1968, USAF
SR-71 aircraft began to arrive at Kadena
to take over the BLACK SHIELD commitment, and by gradual stages the
A-12 was placed on standby to back up the SR-71. The last operational
mission flown by OXCART was on 8 May 1968 over North Korea, following
which the Kadena Detachment was advised to prepare to go home. Project
Headquarters selected 8 June 1968 as the earliest possible date to
begin redeployment, and in the meantime flights of A-12 aircraft were
to be limited to those essential for maintaining flying safety and
pilot proficiency. After BLACK SHIELD aircraft arrived in the US they
would proceed to storage. Those already at base were placed in storage
by 7 June.
(S) During its final days
overseas the OXCART enterprise suffered yet
another blow, as inexplicable as it was tragic. On 4 June Aircraft No.
129, piloted by Jack Weeks, set out from Kadena on a check flight
necessitated by a change of engine. Weeks was heard from when 520 miles
east of Manila. Then he disappeared. Search and rescue operations found
nothing. No cause for the accident was ever ascertained, and it remains
a mystery to this day. Once again the official news release identified
the lost aircraft as an SR-71 and security was maintained.
(S) A few days afterwards the
two remaining planes on Okinawa flew to
the US and were stored with the remainder of the OXCART family.
(S) Postscript
(S) In Summary; the OXCART
Program lasted just over ten years, from its
inception in 1957 through first flights in 1962 to termination in 1968.
Lockheed produced 15 OXCARTS, three YF-12A's and 31 SR-71's. The 49
supersonic aircraft had completed more than 7,300 flights, with 17,000
hours in the air. Over 2,400 hours had been above Mach 3. Five OXCART
were lost in accidents; two pilots were killed, and two had narrow
escapes. In addition, two F-101 chase planes were lost with their Air
Force pilots during OXCART testing phase.
(U) The main objective of the
program-to create a reconnaissance
aircraft of unprecedented speed, range, and altitude capability-was
triumphantly achieved. It may well be, however, that the most important
aspects of the effort lay in its by-products, the notable advances in
aerodynamic design, engine performance, cameras, electronic
countermeasures, pilot life support systems, antiair devices, and above
all in milling, machining, and shaping titanium. Altogether it was a
pioneering accomplishment.
(S) In a ceremony at the Nevada
base on 26 June 1968, Vice Admiral
Rufus L. Taylor, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, presented the
CIA Intelligence Star for valor to pilots Kenneth S. Collins, Ronald L.
Layton, Francis J. Murray, Dennis B. Sullivan, and Mele Vojvodich for
participation in the BLACK SHIELD operation. The posthumous award to
pilot Jack W. Weeks was accepted by his widow. The United States Air
Force Legion of Merit was presented to Colonel Slater and his Deputy,
Colonel Maynard N. Amundson. The Air Force Outstanding Unit Award was
presented to the members of the OXCART Detachment (1129th Special
Activities Squadron, Detachment 1) and the USAF supporting units.
(U) Wives of the pilots were
present and learned for the first time of
the activities in which their husbands had been involved. Kelly Johnson
was a guest speaker at the ceremony, and lamented in moving words the
end of an enterprise which had Marked his most outstanding achievement
in aircraft design. His own awards had already been received: The
Presidents Medal of Freedom in 1964, and on 10 February 1966, the
National Medal of Science, from President Johnson, for his
contributions to aerospace science and to the national security.